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THE MANY PROBLEMS OF SOVEREIGN LIABILITY
Stanley Mosk*
It is rare indeed when a contemporary legal concept can be traced
to a single source. Yet it is dear that the trend toward abolition of
sovereign immunity began with a three-part law review article by
Professor Edwin Borchard back in 1924.1 His scathing denunciation
of governmental immunity fell on deaf ears for some time. This is
remarkable, for a cursory reading of his rationale renders it difficult
to understand why courts and legislatures throughout the country
took so long to reach the conclusion of Mskopf v. Corning Hosp.
Dist.2
Borchard wrote in part:
... it requires but a slight appreciation of the facts to realize
that in Anglo-American law the individual citizen is left to bear
almost all the risks of a defective, negligent, perverse or erroneous
administration of the State's functions, an unjust burden which is
becoming graver and more frequent as the Government's activities
become more diversified and as we leave to administrative officers
in even greater degree the determination of the legal relations of
the individual citizen. Obviously the Administration cannot be held
to the obligation of guaranteeing the citizen against all errors or
defects, for life in an organized community requires a certain num-
ber of sacrifices and even risks. The unexampled expansion of the
police power in the United States daily illustrates the uncompen-
sated sacrifices to which the individual is exposed by the rightful
operation of the State's public powers. Yet there is no reason why
the most flagrant of the injuries wrongfully sustained by the citizen,
those arising from the torts of officers, should be allowed to rest,
as they now generally do, in practice if not in theory, at the door
of the unfortunate citizen alone. This hardship becomes the more
incongruous when it is realized that it is greatest in countries like
Great Britain and the United States, where democracy is assumed
to have placed the individual on the highest plane of political free-
dom and individual justice. When Justice Miller of the United
• Associate Justice, Supreme Court of California. Justice Mosk was a judge of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles for 16 years, Attorney General of California for nearly
six years, and has been on the California Supreme Court since September 1964.
1 Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25).
2 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961). In AMuskopf Justice (now
Chief Justice) Traynor, speaking for a majority of the court, held that the common law
rule of governmental immunity from tort liability must be discarded as mistaken and
unjust. Thus, the plaintiff was held to have a valid cause of action against the defendant
for alleged negligent treatment causing further injury to the broken hip for which she
was being treated.
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States Supreme Court remarked in Gibbons v. United States that
'no government has ever held itself liable to individuals for the
misfeasance, laches or unauthorized exercise of power by its officers
or agents,'[ 3] his horizon was extremely limited, for he overlooked
the fact that practically every country of western Europe has long
admitted such liability. There seems no sound reason why the
English-speaking countries, where the public service is usually in
less professional hands than on the continent, should not adopt
modern social and legal relations between the Government in its
administration of the public services, the officers and agents whom
it employs for this service, and the individual members of the
community. It was Lord Macaulay who remarked that 'the primary
end of Government is the protection of the persons and property
of men.'
The reason for this long-continued and growing injustice in
Anglo-American law rests, of course, upon a medieval English
theory that 'the King can do no wrong,' which without sufficient
understanding was introduced with the common law into this coun-
try, and has survived mainly by reason of its antiquity. The facts
that the conditions which gave it birth and that the theory of abso-
lutism which kept it alive in England41 never prevailed in this
country and have since been discarded by the most monarchical
countries in Europe, have nevertheless been unavailing to secure
legislative reconsideration of the propriety and justification of the
rule that the State is not legally liable for the torts of its officers.5
Undaunted by his earlier cry in the wilderness, Professor Borchard
continued his writings, including the following in 1942:
The present issue is therefore no longer one of proving the impro-
priety of old rules which purported to discharge a societal obliga-
tion by throwing liability on a negligent but often financially irre-
sponsible officer or body, but of distributing effectively and justly
the costs of official maladministration due to the inevitable conse-
quences of human deficiencies in the operation of the governmental
machine. On the one hand, it is now recognized as unfair to allow
the unfortunate victim of official negligence to sustain alone the
burden of his loss; on the other hand, it is poor administration to
purport to make the officer alone responsible. Foreign systems had
a 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 274 (1868).
4 The basis of sovereign immunity was an opinion of Lord Somers in 1175, quoted
at length by Justice Iredell in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 437-41
(1793).
5 Borchard, supra note 1, at 1-2. That the conditions "never prevailed in this country"
is not entirely accurate. In THE FEDERALST No. 81, at 602 (Hamilton ed. 1892).
Hamilton wrote: "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general practice of mankind; and
the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the govern-
ment of every State in the union."
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long reached the conclusion that the employing governmental unit
should stand behind its erring official and assume responsibility for
the community as a whole for certain types of flagrant defects in
administration.6
Only one jurisdiction rose to the challenge. New York was the
first state to waive sovereign immunity against suit and it has done
so more completely than any other American jurisdiction, including
the United States. It must be noted that New York, to its credit,
did so back in 1919 before the movement favoring abolition had
achieved any considerable momentum.7 The State of Illinois has
been subject to tort liability since 1945.8 When California joined the
group in 1961 with the Muskopf case and Lipman v. Brisbane Ele-
mentary School Dist.,9 the three most populous states recognized that
the sovereign could do wrong, and that when it did, its citizens were
entitled to redress. I suspect the factor of population-more people
in government and more people subject to contact with government
-impelled action by the three areas of concentrated humanity. On
the other hand, it should be noted that Alaska, Hawaii, Kentucky,
and North Carolina also have imposed broad tort liability upon
state government.'0
The New York act provided that "The State hereby waives its
immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and
consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same
rules of law as applied to actions in the Supreme Court against indi-
viduals or corporations."" Only one express limitation is contained
and that relates to torts committed by the organized militia. As
stated in Jackson v. State,12 "The State thus provides for four things
6 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 282-83 (1942).
7 Actually New York eliminated its governmental immunity in one limited instance
by acts passed in 1817 and 1821. Involved were claims against the State arising out of
construction of the Erie Canal. In 1919 N.Y. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 264 now N.Y. CT. OF
CLAIMs AcT § 12, expressly waived the state's immunity from tort liability.
8 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 §§ 439.1-.24 (1957) revising the 1945 Court of Claims
Act which made the State liable for damages in tort up to $7500 for the negli-
gence of its officers, agents or employees; see Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
Dist. No. 302, 18 11. 2d 11, 163 NXE.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
9 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
10 See Morrison v. Dept. of Highways, 252 S.W.2d 426 (Ky. 1952); Alliance Co. v.
State Hospital at Butner, 241 N.C. 329, 85 S.E.2d 386 (1955). Other jurisdictions have
practically eliminated sovereign immunity; see, e.g., Hargrave v. Town of Cocoa Beach,
96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d
1 (1961); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962);
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) ; Hernandez v.
County of Yuma, 91 Ariz. 35, 369 P.2d 271 (1962).
11 N.Y. LAws 1929, c. 467, § 12-a, in effect Sept. 1, 1929.
12 261 N.Y. 134, 137, 184 N.E. 735, 736 (1933).
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which shall result from the infliction of personal injuries due to
the negligence of its officers and employees while acting as such
officers or employees. It waives immunity from liability, ... and it
confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear and determine
such claims of liability." A new Court of Claims Act, now in effect,
was adopted in 1939.'1
At first blush that would seem to be a clear and unequivocal
waiver of all immunity. Yet the legal mind immediately discerned
a problem. The state is to be liable in accordance with the rules of
law applicable to "individuals or corporations." That leaves no doubt
of the state's liability for torts when it engages in activities in which
private individuals and corporations engage. But it is also clear that
the state performs many functions which are not performed by pri-
vate persons and corporations, and by their intrinsic nature cannot
be performed by such persons.
Thus arose the distinction between "governmental" and "propri-
etary" functions. It has been said that generally no liability accrues
for strictly governmental functions.14
But in that regard, it must be conceded that many activities carried
on by government are of a nature so unique, and in some instances
so inherently dangerous, that no private industry would undertake
the administrative risk involved. Certainly this is true of law enforce-
ment, firefighting, care of mental patients, maintenance of juvenile
detention facilities, operation of jails, and control and treatment of
communicable diseases.
Prior to 1961 California law regarding the liability of a public
entity for the torts of a public employee was determined by the same
factors. An entity was deemed liable for proprietary activities and
immune from liability for strictly governmental activities.15 An em-
ployee was liable for ministerial actions and immune from liability
for discretionary acts. Without exception the protection granted to
the employee for torts resulting from discretionary acts or omissions
extended also to the employer.""
13 N.Y. CT. OF CLAIMS Acr §§ 1-29.
14 Annot. 40 A.L.R.2d 927 (1955) ; see Henry v. City of Los Angeles, 114 Cal. App.
2d 603, 604, 250 P.2d 643, 644 (1952) ; Oppenheimer v. City of Los Angeles, 104 Cal.
App. 2d 545, 548, 232 P.2d 26, 28 (1951) ; Norton v. Hoffman, 34 Cal. App. 2d 189,
194, 93 P.2d 250, 253 (1939) ; Wood v. Cox, 10 Cal. App. 2d 652, 653, 52 P.2d 565
(1935).
15 Brindamour v. Murray, 7 Cal. 2d 73, 59 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1936); Johnson v.
Fresno County, 64 Cal. App. 2d 576, 149 P.2d 38 (1944).
16 See Kennedy and Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign Without Immunity, 36
So. CAL. L. Rav. 161 (1963).
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Both Muskopf and Lipman left untouched the "discretionary act"
rule to the extent that it protected the employee. However, the pro-
tection formerly available to the public entity was abolished.
Muskopf imposed general liability upon the public entity, thereby
eliminating the need to determine whether the activity involved was
proprietary or governmental. Lipman suggested that the liability of
the entity would not be coextensive with the liability of the employee-
tortfeasor, but would depend upon various other factors, such as
the importance of the public functions, the extent to which liability
might impair free exercise of these functions, and the presence
of remedies other than tort suits for damages. Under Lipman a find-
ing that the employee's act was discretionary would not protect the
entity. It would have been necessary to show in addition that some
vital public interest would be threatened if immunity were denied
the entity. But legislative action in 1963 forecloses this possibility
by providing that a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting
from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is
immune from liability.1 7
Under the liability provisions of the new legislation, the employee
is liable as a private person for his tortious conduct unless otherwise
provided, and he is accorded the defenses normally available to
private persons. The primary exception is for discretionary acts. Now
the entity is liable if the employee is liable and is immune if the
employee is immune. The entity is liable as a private person, there-
fore, except where immunity has been granted by statutory exception.
The question that will of necessity be presented to California courts
hereafter is whether the act or omission was discretionary or min-
isterial.
The 1963 legislation restated the pre-existing law on discretionaryimmunity. A brief review of the California decisions indicates that
the doctrine of discretionary immunity, like the concept of the rea-
sonable and prudent man, is often mentioned but only vaguely
understood.1 8 A need to protect public officials from damage suits
when injuries result from the exercise of official judgment and dis-
cretion has long been recognized. But there has been little uniformity
in applying the doctrine to specific cases. The modern trend seems
to protect public employees who act in good faith in exercising
discretion, but to withhold protection when bad faith is encountered.
17 See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6.
18 People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 2d 754, 178 P.2d 1 (1947); Green v. State,
73 Cal. 29, 11 Pac. 602 (1887); Alameda County v. Chambers, 35 Cal. App. 537,
170 Pac. 650 (1917).
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The pre-existing law on discretionary immunity may be summarized
as follows: first, any exercise of judgment may be construed as
discretionary; second, scope of authority includes anything collateral
or incidental to the main duty of the office of the person acting; and
third, the employee who acts within the scope of his authority in
performing a discretionary duty will be immune from liability,
even-and this is not unanimous-if motivated by malice, dis-
honesty, corruption or carelessness.'"
The 1963 Legislature did not define discretionary immunity. The
scope of employment, however, has been clarified by provisions deal-
ing with activities which the case law protected as discretionary. The
scope of immunity includes the following types of activities: 20 exe-
cution or enforcement of any law, or enforcement of enactments
which are unconstitutional, invalid, or inapplicable; adoption or
failure to adopt enactments; issuance, revocation or denial of
licenses, permits and certificates of authorization; health and safety
inspections of private property; injuries caused by other persons;
prosecution of judicial or administrative proceedings; authorized
entries upon private property; money stolen from official custody;
misrepresentation.
This raises the additional question of the standard of care required
of the employee. This appears to vary with the type of activity. Due
care is required in the execution of a law; good faith for acting
under an enactment which is invalid, inapplicable or unconstitu-
tional; good faith and probable cause for instituting or prosecuting
a judicial or administrative proceeding. The employee must indem-
nify the public entity for recoveries made against the entity for the
acts of the employee involving actual fraud, corruption or malice.
While this would seem to apply only to malicious prosecution and
possibly to action under an invalid enactment, this may suggest a
minimum standard bearing upon other types of tortious conduct. 21
The Lipman case, as mentioned before, suggested three factors
that helped to furnish a means of deciding whether the agency in
a particular case should have immunity. These include the impor-
tance to the public of the function involved, the extent to which
governmental liability might impair free exercise of the function,
19 Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 (1856); see Van Aistyne, Government Tort Liability:
A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 463, 474-75 (1963).
20 Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 927 (1955).
21 Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal. 2d 577, 311 P.2d 494 (1957).
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and the availability to individuals affected of remedies other than
tort suits for damages.2"
A Minnesota Law Review article criticized Lipman for its discus-
sion of the deterrent effect of state liability. The article argued that
personal immunity has been given because it is thought that the
financial consequences attendant to suit and liability would stifle
official action. But when the pocketbook touched by liability is the
state's, rather than the individual's, the more valid assumption may
be that the only deterrent effect would be a fear on the part of
officials that a trial would disclose personal, rather than public,
motives for the particular action. It seems such an effect would not
hamper the exercise of discretionary power, but would merely tend
to insure the competence and propriety of that exercise.28
However, the Minnesota author concedes that "at some point the
courts should refuse to allow juries to second-guess legislative, exec-
utive, and judicial discretionary decisions."24 The only solution it
suggests, however, is a case-by-case adjudication.
This is probably inevitable at this point in our all-too-brief history
of sovereign liability. To date, only one case has reached the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court since the 1963 legislative enactments: County
of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, decided in June, 1965.25 The
question involved was whether the legislature had the power to
retroactively abrogate what the real party in interest contended was
a vested right, arising as the result of injuries allegedly sustained in
the Los Angeles County Hospital. The California Supreme Court
held that although the legislature normally legislates prospectively,
it can provide for retroactive application of a statute if it has a
reasonable basis for doing so. It was pointed out that the legislature
responded to our court's abrogation of the common-law doctrine of
governmental immunity by enacting comprehensive legislation re-
garding governmental liability for the acts of public employees and
public officers. The court held it was not unfair to apply the statute
retroactively since retroactivity in this instance serves to clarify the
fiscal responsibilities of public entities. The court pointed out that
persons injured prior to the Muskopf case could not have achieved
22 55 Cal. 2d 224, 230, 359 P.2d 465, 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1961). Lipman,
however, concedes: "it may not be possible to set forth a definitive rule which would
determine in every instance whether a governmental agency is liable for discretionary
acts of its offidals."
28 46 MiNN. L. REY. 1143, 1151 (1962).
24 Id. at 1153.
25 62 Cal. 2d 839, 402 P.2d 868, 44 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1965).
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any vested rights for they certainly could not have anticipated the
decision in view of the previous state of the law. Having achieved
no vested rights the plaintiff there suffered no abrogation of vested
rights by retroactive application of the 1963 act.26
The logical question in this year of 1966 is: Where do we go
from here? What problems may we anticipate, legal, governmental,
and fiscal? For example, a number of textwriters on the subject of
public liability have expressed the fear that claims may cause public
entities to come perilously close to bankruptcy. The County Counsel
of Los Angeles has itemized the claims against the County of Los
Angeles filed between 1947 and 1962.7 For all of those years he
lists claims totaling $123,000,000. But significantly, of that sum
almost half consisted of two specific claims, one for $50,000,000 for
alleged wrongful taking of oil and gas rights in property occupied
by the sheriff's honor farm, and $9,500,000 for landslide damage in
the Portuguese Bend area. While the County of Los Angeles is only
one governmental entity, certainly it is a significantly large agency
and, I might add irreverently, it exists in a particularly litigious
community. It has not yet been demonstrated that sovereign liability
endangers governmental solvency.
For legal authority on the broad range of future problems, I sug-
gest that courts in California and in other new sovereign liability
states may well look to New York state cases, since New York, as
previously indicated, was the first to impose governmental liability.
As possible guidelines, therefore, let us cursorily glance at some
decisions of New York courts. I do not dogmatically cite these as
the final word, but only as some indicia of what may be anticipated
in a number of areas.
LEGISLATIVE Acrs
As long ago as 1917 New York held in Barrett v. State28 that the
state is not liable for damages resulting from a legislative act, as
distinguished from a failure to execute a legislative policy with due
care. In the Barrett case, trees belonging to the claimants had been
destroyed by beaver, and the claimants contended this was due to the
26 "'Describing a right as 'vested' is merely conclusory," said the court, in County of
Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra note 25, at 844, 402 P.2d at 871, 44 Cal. Rptr. at
799, citing Flournoy v. State, 230 Cal. App. 2d 520, 531, 41 Cal. Rptr. 190, 197
(1964).
27 36 So. CAL. L. Rav. 161, 171 (1963).
28 Barrett v. State, 220 N.Y. 423, 116 N.E. 99 (1917).
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fact that the legislature had passed certain laws prohibiting the hunt-
ing of beaver. The statutes had been enacted because beaver had be-
come virtually extinct in New York. The lower courts held for the
claimants and the intermediate appellate court affirmed. But the Court
of Appeals determined there could be no recovery since the legis-
lature, in enacting the protecting statute, was exercising a govern-
mental function, and a cause of action could not lie for any resulting
incidental damage. The court added that even if the statute had been
unconstitutional, that would not have created any liability since then
the claimants could have disregarded the unconstitutional statute
with impunity and directly protected their own property by destroy-
ing beaver.
The Bdrrett case is still considered law in New York a half-century
later. The basic theory is that a court cannot find the state liable on
the basis of harm created by a legislative act without in essence hold-
ing that its judgment as to what is reasonable is to be preferred to
the judgment of the legislature. This would constitute a violation
of the principle of separation of powers.
In 1952 the United States Court of Claims adopted the same rule
in expressly holding that no liability may be imposed upon the
United States Government because of the enactment of a congres-
sional act where due care has been used in its execution.29
I would suggest there is one fundamental limitation on the fore-
going basic rule. If a legislative act amounts to an actual taking of
private property, of course under the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution compensation must be paid. This suggests
the possibility of seeking redress for a loss in the form of asserting
appropriation of private property rather than alleging commission
of a tort.
,JUDICIAL AcTs
It has been clear in common law since 1810 that a judge is not
liable for acts which he performs in a judicial capacity.30
There being no liability on the judge as an original wrongdoer,
it would seem that the state cannot be held liable for judicial acts
since its liability is wholly derivative. And in addition it has been
29 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1959).
30 Douglas v. State, 296 N.Y. 530, 68 N.E.2d 605 (1946); Fishbein v. State, 282
App. Div. 600, 125 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1953); Mudge v. State, 271 App. Div. 1039, 68
N.Y.S.2d 388 (1947).
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urged that state liability based upon respondeat superior cannot be
applicable as between the state and judicial officers since they are
not subject to any effective administrative control.8'
With an understandably sanctimonious and self-serving air, courts
themselves have held that this principle is so necessary to insure
judicial independence that it "obtains in all countries where there
is any well ordered system of jurisprudence." 2
While that may be an oversimplification-as a matter of fact there
is such liability for judicial acts in modern Germany and Austria-it
does seem that a withdrawal of immunity for judicial acts would
probably open the door for disgruntled litigants to relitigate decided
issues.
QuASI-JuDICIAL Acrs
Somewhat less rigid, but nonetheless persistent, are holdings by
New York courts that administrative agencies acting in a quasi-
judicial capacity are immune from liability. Since it is frequently
difficult to distinguish between a genuinely judicial function when
performed by an administrative agency and an action which is merely
ministerial in character, there has been a tendency on the part of
courts to extend the state's immunity into this entire area for policy
reasons.
For example, in Toyos v. State3 3 the court declined to relitigate
questions of law or fact decided by the state Liquor Authority in
the case of a person whose liquor license had been revoked. Similarly,
in Chikofsky v. State,4 the court refused to permit one to recover
after injury in a motor vehicle accident on the ground that the license
of the driver causing the injury should have been revoked before the
accident. The court held that this would unduly burden the Bureau
of Motor Vehicles and impair its discretionary functions. Similarly,
New York courts have refused damages to an unsuccessful applicant
for a position with a state department or agency who challenged the
discretion of the appointing authority where the evidence indicated
31 Farrell v. State, 204 Misc. 148, 123 N.Y.S.2d 29 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
32 Ginsberg v. Stem, 19 F.R.D. 238, 241 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
33 181 Misc. 761, 47 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Ct. Cl. 1944) ; see also Yereshefsky v. State,
180 Misc. 191, 40 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Ct. CI. 1943); Muller v. State, 178 Misc. 360, 34
N.Y.S.2d 275 (Ct. Cl. 1942).
34 203 Misc. 646, 117 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Ct. Cl. 1952) ; see also Craver v. State, 204
Misc. 214, 123 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1953) ; Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d
704 (1945); Murrain v. Wilson Line, 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1946);
Kells v. State, 200 Misc. 867, 107 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Ct. CI. 1951).
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the civil service laws had been respected. 5 Here again the rationale
is that appointing officers must have necessary independence of
judgment.
New York has generally absolved its public employees even where
a serious mistake was made. In Bertch v. State8 the claimant was
compelled by state troopers to turn over his driver's license and
registration plates. Later it developed that the order had been ad-
dressed to the claimant by mistake and that another individual was
involved. The Court of Claims declined to hold the state liable for
this mistake. It seems difficult to justify a conclusion of this kind,
however, since it clearly was a ministerial error and in no way could
be deemed a judicial or quasi-judicial function. On the other hand,
in New York the state has consistently been held liable for the
erroneous posting of traffic signs that have been responsible for
accidents. 7
INSPECTION SERVICES
There is somewhat of a conflict in New York cases regarding the
state's liability for negligent issuance of licenses and for failure to
properly inspect either persons or premises subsequently involved in
an accident. It appears that a cause of action arises only if the
applicable statute creates a "duty" toward the particular claimant,
and therefore the cases seem to turn essentially on a question of
general tort law. 8
Thus, a claimant injured as the result of a failure to inspect or
of a negligent inspection will, as a general rule, be within the ambit
of the risk created by the state's negligent act.39 If that were not the
case, there would be little purpose served by an inspection statute.
On the other hand, this state liability has not been held applicable
35 Reiser v. State, 198 Misc. 647, 98 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
386 193 Misc. 259, 83 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
37 Ziehm v. State, 270 App. Div. 876, 61 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1946); Foley v. State, 294
N.Y. 275, 62 N.E.2d 69 (1945).
38 Young v. State, 304 N.Y. 677, 107 N.E.2d 94 (1952) ; Metildi v. State, 177 Misc.
179, 30 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1941); Di Caprio v. New York Cent. R.R., 231 N.Y.
94, 131 N.E. 746 (1921).
30 For liability of state to users of state-owned buildings who are injured because of
dangerous defects therein, see Ryan v. State, 192 Misc. 408, 77 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Ct. Cl.
1948); Johnson v. State, 172 Misc. 776, 16 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Ct. Cl. 1939); Barker v.
Kruger Grocery & Baking Co., 107 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1939); Simpson v. State, 275
App. Div. 1034, 92 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1949) ; Hovey v. State, 287 N.Y. 663, 39 N.E.2d
287 (1941). For liability of state for maintenance of state-owned lands, see Le Roux v.
State, 281 App. Div. 1065, 121 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1953); Kittle v. State, 272 N.Y. 420,
3 N.E.2d 850 (1936).
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where reformatories, jails, or similar institutions are involved. There
are other notable exceptions. In Rosensweig v. State4° a claim was
dismissed where an effort was made to hold the state liable for the
death of a prizefighter on the ground that the state Athletic Com-
mission physician who examined him before the bout was negligent
in not recognizing that the boxer was physically unfit to fight."
Similarly, where a person purchased a car which later was dis-
covered to have been stolen, on the faith of a state-issued registra-
tion certificate, the state was not held liable. 2
PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC PEACE AND SAFETY
In New York a distinction is drawn between municipal activities
relating to public peace and safety and those of the state. Municipal
agencies are held liable for negligent acts of commission but not
for negligent acts of omission. On the other hand, New York im-
poses no liability for any acts of the National Guard on the theory
that the Guard engages in a function which is peculiarly govern-
mental in nature and is not susceptible to an analogy with the
functions of any private person or corporation.
In the field of handling of criminals, New York imposes liability
on the state for negligence resulting in injury to a prison inmate,4
but it does not impose liability for damages caused to third persons
by an escaped convict whose flight was permitted by the negligent
conduct of prison guards. 4 'While this distinction is difficult to ra-
tionalize, it appears that the reason is wholly pragmatic. In one
instance the injury is restricted to one particular individual whereas
in the other liability for acts of an escaped prisoner could affect in-
numerable persons.
It was held in Warner v. State" that "agents of the state, as well
as private citizens, are bound to observe the requirements of the law
before an individual may justifiably be held in a mental institution
and subjected to its impact and stigma; failure to do so renders the
state liable for the wrong." It was also held in the same case that
40 5 App. Div. 2d 293, 171 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1958).
41 See 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 79, 81 (1962).
42 Paglia v. State, 278 App. Div. 281, 105 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1951).
43 Scarnato v. State, 272 App. Div. 1085, 74 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1947); White v. State,
139 N.Y. 193, 34 N.E.2d 896 (1941); Washington v. State, 277 App. Div. 1079,
100 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1950).
44 Valentine v. State, 277 App. Div. 1069, 100 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1950).
45 297 N.Y. 395, 79 N.E.2d 459 (1948).
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this applies to "illegal or improper procedure as well as for acting
upon an insufficient or improper basis."46
California has provided state immunity for injuries sustained in
mental institutions.4 7 Challenged as an unreasonable classification
by the plaintiff in County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court48 the
court held "in limiting governmental liability for the operation of
mental institutions, the legislature could appropriately consider the
special problems of diagnosis and treatment in the field of mental
illness, the problems of excessive patient load in public mental in-
stitutions that must take all patients committed to them, and the
problems that may arise with respect to the competency of the men-
tally ill as witnesses."
California has also provided statutory immunity in the field of
fire protection.49 Thus, failure to provide fire protection service or
failure to maintain sufficient personnel will not give rise to a cause
of action. Although the California Supreme Court has granted a
hearing and will supercede the existing opinion, the 1965 case of
Heieck & Moran v. City of Modesto ° is worth noting. There it was
held that a cause of action would lie for the negligence of a city
employee in turning off a water valve without notice to persons
who had a reasonable right to rely on the water controlled by that
valve for fire protection. The court discussed the legislative intent
from the Law Revision Commission's comment and recommenda-
tion to the legislature that:
The community is entitled to no greater level of fire protection and
water service than it determines through its responsible public
officials to acquire, and the threat of tort liability should not be
interposed to insist that the system be wholly adequate to all present
and future demands made upon it. A negligently conceived or
mediocre system may well be better than no system at all. But the
community, having deteimined as a matter of policy to adopt a
46 Id. at 404, 79 N.E.2d at 462.
47 CAL. Gov. CODE, § 854.8. New York reached a contrary conclusion in Scolavino
v. State, 297 N.Y. 460, 74 N.E.2d 174 (1947), on the theory that the state was aware
of the bad feeling between Scolavino and the patient who assaulted him. A similar result
was reached in Martindale v. State, 269 N.Y. 554, 199 N.E. 667 (1935), on the theory
that the state was aware the decedent was possessed of a desire and propensity to escape;
see also Daley v. State, 298 N.Y. 880, 84 N.E.2d 801 (1942) (state was aware of
decedent's suicidal tendencies) ; Curley v. State, 148 Misc. 336, 265 N.Y.S. 762 (Ct.
Cl. 1933) (state was aware of the assaultive nature of the individual and nevertheless
placed him in a room with 63 other patients with inadequate supervision).
48 62 Cal. 2d 839, 846, 402 P.2d 868, 872, 44 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800 (1965).
49 See CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 850.2, 850.4.
Go 237 Adv. Cal. App. 348, 46 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1965).
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system having a planned level of performance, should be entitled
to rely upon the personnel in charge of that system to maintain
and operate it with reasonable prudence and diligence. 5'
An interesting and developing corollary of the right to recovery
against the state is the right of a state peace officer to recover against
a property owner for injuries sustained on his property while in-
vestigating a crime. Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible ChurchP2
permitted no recovery, but the dissent was praised in the 1964 An-
nual Survey of American Law at page 430. Dissenting Justice Gibson
stated that "the common law rule labeling firemen [and policemen]
licensees is but an illogical anachronism, originating in a vastly dif-
ferent social order, and pock-marked by judicial refinements, and
should not be perpetuated in the name of 'stare decisis' .... ,,1
FOREIGN IMMUNy
One word about foreign sovereign immunity, that is, claims against
another national government. It is now clearly established that State
Department policy is controlling, and under the distinction between
"public" and "private" acts announced in the Tate Letter and ap-
proved by the Supreme Court" a certification of immunity by the
State Department is deemed to be controlling upon federal courts.
Through the Tate Letter;5 the executive branch of the federal
government has implied that it will not be hampered in its conduct
of foreign relations if a court employs a conception of commercial
transactions rooted in the American free enterprise attitude toward
commerce. Thus, in contract the court will attempt to discern whether
the matter is commercial in nature. If in tort, the test is whether the
tort resulted from an act pursued from an economic motive or pur-
pose. The rule, then, seems to be that a nation will not have the risks
of its acts weighed against their importance or utility by a foreign
jurisdiction unless the transaction in question is motivated by profit.50
51 5 CAL. L. REVISION COMm'N, Sovereign Immunity Study (1963).
52 175 Ohio St. 163, 192 N.E.2d 38 (1963).
53 Id. at 178, 192 N.E.2d at 47 (quoting from Dini v. Naiditch, 20 111. 2d 406,
416, 170 N.E.2d 881, 885 (1960)).
54 National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955) ; see also Republic
of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); 63 YA.LE L.J. 1148 (1954).
55 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). This was an open letter from the State De-
partment to the Attorney General declaring the policy of the United States Executive
Department to be that sovereign immunity would apply to public acts of a foreign state
but not to its private or commercial acts; e.g., chartering a ship to transport grain would
be in the latter category.
56 17 STAN. L. REV. 501 (1965).
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HIGHWAY ACCIDENTS
This, of course, is the area in which most claims against public
entities arise. Again we look to New York cases.
The state's duty with respect to highways was described in Boyce
Motor Lines v. State1 in these words:
It had a duty to construct and maintain its highways in a reasonably
safe condition, in accordance with the terrain encountered and traffic
conditions to be reasonably apprehended. But even so, a certain
risk was unavoidable. Roads cannot always be straight and level,
and curves with descending grades are always potentially dangerous.
A highway may be said to be reasonably safe when people who
exercise ordinary care can and do travel over it safely.
While it is dear that the state owes to users of its highways the
duty of so constructing and maintaining not only the traveled por-
tion of the road but also the shoulders so that they are in a reason-
ably safe condition for use by the prudent driver travelling at a
reasonable speed in an emergency, 8 the state does not owe to users
of its highways the duty of constructing and maintaining shoulders so
that they may be used for general travel."' Where the construction
and reconstruction of a highway and an adjoining gutter were con-
trary to the state's own specifications and good engineering prac-
tices, the state has been held liable.6 0
Cases are legion in holding the state liable for holes, heaves, and
humps in the highway of which it had actual or constructive knowl-
edge. As stated in Camuglia v. State,61 "It was the duty of the state
not to leave the area in question for use by the public unless it was
reasonably certain that it could be safely used." But one word of
caution is indicated in Lurie v. State62 in which it was pointed out that
"proof of the condition of a highway over a considerable distance
is generally double-edged because while it may show notice to the
state that the highway is in need of repair it also shows that the
claimant driver should have been on guard for his own safety."
57 280 App. Div. 693, 696, 117 N.Y.S.2d 289, 292 (1952).
58 Taylor v. State, 288 N.Y. 542, 41 N.E.2d 939 (1942).
59 O'Brien v. State, 289 N.Y. 675, 45 N.E.2d 176 (1942).
60 Foley v. State, 304 N.Y. 778, 109 N.E.2d 77 (1952).
61 197 Misc. 180, 182, 94 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581 (Ct. Cl. 1950); see also Dox v. State,
272 App. Div. 1100, 75 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1947); Wasnick v. State, 295 N.Y. 900, 68
N.E.2d 22 (1946); Lawrence v. State, 281 App. Div. 922, 119 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1953);
Clark v. State, 280 App. Div. 187, 112 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1952) ; Miner v. State, 277 App.
Div. 921, 98 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1950); Brown v. State, 178 Misc. 936, 36 N.Y.S.2d 643
(Ct. Cl. 1942).
62 282 App. Div. 913, 125 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1953).
1966]
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEWV
New York cases are clear that the mere proof of skidding on a
highway will not result in holding the state liable even if there is
proof of prior accidents at the same locality.68 On the other hand, if
it can be shown that the skidding was caused by a "fatty" or "bleed-
ing" pavement-one in which there is an excess amount of asphalt
or bituminous material which renders the surface slick or slippery-
liability may result.64 The state may be liable for the failure to erect
a guard rail or barrier "wherein the situations were such as to deceive
persons traveling on the highway into thinking that the road was
straight."65 Liability has been found where a barrier had been
broken in a previous accident and had not been replaced."0 On the
other hand, it is clear that the duty of the state to erect adequate
barriers where the location and condition of the highway creates an
unusual danger or foreseeable hazard to careful travel, does not
include the erection of guard rails "at points normally not
hazardous."67
Cases have held that where the state knew or should have known
from the appearance of a tree-such as lack of foliage, decay, ex-
posed roots, dead branches, the way it leaned-that such tree was a
source of danger to users of the highway, a user of the highway who
without fault was struck by a branch falling from a tree may recover
damages from the state.68 Clearly, however, the state is not liable if
there was no evidence from which it could be found that the public
agency knew or should have known that a tree limb was defective. 9
Burning leaves by state employees causing smoke that obscured
the vision of a driver might be the basis for state liability under
certain circumstances. Since the smoke is clearly visible however, it
is difficult for the claimant to justify continuing to drive and thus
avoid a charge of contributory negligence.70
The state has frequently been held liable for falling rocks and
landslides on the theory that "if the highway could not be made safe
for travel, it should have been closed. '71
63 Wesley v. State, 272 App. Div. 990, 72 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1947); see also Tortora
v. State, 269 N.Y. 167, 199 N.E. 44 (1935).
64 Karl v. State, 279 N.Y. 555, 18 N.E.2d 852 (1939); Potter-De Witt v. State, 277
App. Div. 1158, 101 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1950).
05 Ross v. State, 265 N.Y. 632, 193 N.E. 420 (1934).
66 Wolf v. State, 122 Misc. 381, 202 N.Y.S. 754 (Ct. Cl. 1924).
67 Jacobs v. State, 198 Misc. 406, 98 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
68 Messinger v. State, 183 Misc. 811, 51 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Ct. Cl. 1944).
69 Mosher v. State, 191 Misc. 804, 77 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
70 Jones v. State, 256 App. Div. 856, 8 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1939).
71 Shaknis v. State. 251 App. Div. 767, 295 N.Y.S. 663 (1937).
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New York has a manual of uniform traffic control devices which
constitutes the rules and regulations of the state traffic commission
with respect to traffic signs, signals and markings. Thus, generally,
the state has been found not liable where warning signs are posted
or omitted in accordance with the manual.7 2 On the other hand, if
the signs are posted or omitted contrary to the rules, or negligently
posted, then liability has generally followed.73
It has been held that the state also has a duty to provide pedes-
trians with a safe place for walking, not only in cities but on
shoulders of rural highways.74
It is abundantly clear, of course, that the state is liable for injuries
sustained by a claimant struck by a state-owned automobile being
negligently driven.7 5 A state employee has the same obligation to
obey the rules of the road as does a private driver.76
The last paper prepared by the late Roscoe Pound dealt with gov-
ernmental immunity. As was true of everything he did, his thesis was
penetrating and incontrovertible. "Our task," said Pound, "is to find
a reasoned solution of the problem of adjusting demands of officials
and agents of officials and those of citizens in a modern politically
organized society." We have made great progress "in providing
remedies for men wronged by governmental operations," he said,
but, he urged, "for us in the United States of today, surely all rem-
nants of the King's immunity should have ended." 77
I think Dean Pound would have been pleased with California, its
Muskopf and Lipman decisions, its 1963 legislative act, and the gen-
eral trend toward providing remedies for those wronged by govern-
mental activities.
72 Casey v. State, 191 Misc. 95, 76 N.Y.S.2d. 572 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
78 Eastman v. State, 278 App. Div. 1, 102 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1951).
74 Wager v. State, 257 App. Div. 580, 14 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1939).
75 Adams v. State, 296 N.Y. 654, 69 N.E.2d 815 (1946).
76 Walter v. State, 187 Misc. 1034, 65 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
77 PouND, Perspecives of Law, in EssAYs FoR AusTIN Scoa-r (1964).
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